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Modelling the Reporting Culture within a Modern 
Organisation 
Ewan Douglas*, Samuel Cromie, M. Chiara Leva, Nora Balfe 
Centre for Innovative Human Systems, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin 2, Ireland  
douglase@tcd.ie 
Research shows that there are many factors that can influence the operation of a “Reporting Culture” 
within organisations, ranging from the attitudes to the workers, to the methodology implemented, to the 
managerial attitudes within the organisation (Reason, 1998).  Understanding and modelling these factors 
may help develop an optimum reporting system. Historically, research has focused on the concept of 
“Near Miss Reporting” which is based on the idea of identifying the “bottom” of the safety triangle concept 
put forward in Heinrich (1941) which suggests that for each accident there are dozens of near misses, and 
identifying these near misses will hopefully allow faults, errors, design problems to be assessed and 
mitigated before they can allow an accident to develop. Reporting near misses is a key factor in a 
proactive Reporting Culture.  
Before any improvement strategy for the reporting culture or system can be developed an organization 
should be able to understand its current practices and the key influencing factors around them. Therefore 
in the current paper we start by presenting a model based on a real world case study developed to 
highlight areas where improvements can be made. Concurrently, a model of best practice is also to be 
developed as a terms of comparison with the current practice to help generate recommendations to 
improve reporting. The model could also potentially allow any new practice to be assessed before it is 
tested in the real world.  
The mapping of current practices was based on a number of semi-structured interviews with both 
managerial staff and the day-to-day staff in a pharmaceutical company. This was undertaken to determine 
the culture within the organisation, the reporting process, the factors that influence the reporting culture, 
etc. The data from these interviews allowed the drafting of a model detailing the reporting process and 
structure within the organisation. In modelling these processes a software tool called SCOPE was used to 
create a visual model of the main reporting tasks and the actors and equipment involved. The tool also 
facilitated the mapping out of relationships between actors, managers, resources, information systems, 
KPIs etc. Those relationships and the factors that than can influence these entities can then be analysed 
using a preliminary hazard analysis and an information-mapping module within the tool. The expected 
benefit of the work is the improvement of reporting practices in the organisation and the validation of the 
factors influencing reporting.  
1. Introduction  
1.1 Background 
Learning from mistakes or previous incidents has long been seen as a method of improving the safety 
level within organisations. To safeguard against human errors, past operator experiences can be collected 
and utilised to improve safety (Tsukada and Kotani, 2001). Within the aerospace and process industries 
there have been a number of efforts to achieve this, ranging from Near Miss Reporting to more proactive 
methodologies of data collection such as day-to-day reporting.  Accident reports commonly suggest that 
often before a loss or accident someone had detected an anomaly but had not reported it using a reporting 
system (Leveson, 2011). Organisations generally rectify this shortcoming by implementing a series of short 
term “fixes” such as improving training or implementing Behavioural Based Safety approaches (Leveson, 
2011). 
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Within the aerospace industry there have been developments to include reporting within the safety culture 
of the organisation (Gramopadhye and Drury 2000). There is pressure for the regulators to maintain a 
good safety culture as a sound aviation maintenance and inspection system is seen as important to 
maintain a safe reliable organisation (Federal Aviation Authority, 1991). 
Accidents such as American Airlines Flight 191 where an unsafe maintenance procedure was the cause of 
a catastrophic failure (National Transportation Safety Board, 1979) or the Flixborough disaster where 
unsafe maintenance procedures were employed leading to a leak of flammable product demonstrate the 
requirement for a risk assessment that collects data dynamically, and allows the risk assessment to be 
dynamically reviewed. 
1.2 What is the Reporting Culture? 
Reporting culture can be considered to be part of the organizational safety culture as a whole (Reason 
1997). Safety Culture emerged from the social and behavioural psychology of the 1950s and 1960s (Cox 
and Cox, 1991). There have been a number of different definitions of safety culture, for example in Uttal 
(1983) safety culture (then referred to as Corporate Culture) is “a system of shared values (what is 
important) and beliefs (how things work) that interact with a company’s people, organizational structures, 
and control systems to produce behavioural norms (the way we do things around here)”. This definition 
was also used in Reason (1998) as the definition of Safety Culture. An alternative definition of 
organisational culture is given in Schneider (1987) where organisational culture is defined as the 
underlying assumptions about the world and about human nature.  Schein (1973) describes safety culture 
as: “the basic assumptions that are invented, discovered or developed by a given group and then taught to 
new members”. Eurocontrol (2006) describes safety culture as “ways of doing things around here.” There 
is a considerable belief in industry that improving the safety culture will make an organisation more 
effective in preventing accidents (Baram and Schoebel, 2007).  Safety Culture is frequently seen within 
industries to be a factor of improving safety awareness and responsibility (Porkka et al., 2013). 
In Reason (1997) five components of safety culture were identified:  
• Informed Culture – This is the system that collects data from events like accidents and near 
misses and integrates them with proactive measures such as safety audits, suggestions etc. This 
requires active involvement from all levels within an organisation to develop a safety culture, 
which is informed and provides a realistic image of the level of safety within the organisation.  
• Reporting Culture – This is the organisational climate where workers will be willing to report near 
misses and accidents openly and honestly. There are many factors that influence this that will be 
discussed later. It is also intrinsically linked to the concept of Just Culture.  
• Just Culture - This accounts for the fact that humans will make mistakes and is a policy where 
honest mistakes can be reported without any fears of ramifications in the hope of improving 
safety.  However the “justness” has to be balanced by both sides so dangerous acts of 
negligence also have to be dealt with accordingly through culpability agreements etc. (Dekker, 
2012) 
• Flexible Culture - This is a culture that can manage safety related changes easily to meet 
changing demands, such as an increased requirement for output, new legislation or equipment 
failure.  
• Learning Culture – This draws appropriate conclusions from any safety information collected 
along with the desire to implement changes to procedures and equipment as deemed necessary  
 
Safety Culture has to be supported by management within the organisation; they can support a “good 
safety culture” by investing in and publicising workplace reporting systems (Johnson, 2003). If an 
organisation is seen to be seeking information on failures its safety record may appear to be worse than it 
would be without a reporting system (Johnson, 2003). Reason (1997) argues that more reports is a 
positive factor than a number of negative reports as there is more information on risks within the 
organisation that can be used to mitigate any potential organisational failings. Phimister et al. (2003) 
describes the following stages for incident reporting: Identify – Report – Prioritise - Causal Analysis – 
Solution Identification – Dissemination – Resolve. The Phimister et al. (2003) model reflects other research 
which emphases the importance of correct dissemination and feedback as an integral part of the reporting 
structure (Williamsen, 2013). People will not make reports if their submitted reports appear to go into a 
“black hole” with nobody responding to it, management have to provide adequate feedback to the 
reporters, this gives the impression that their reports are valued by management  (Leveson, 2011). 
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2. Approaches to Reporting  
Reporting is increasingly being accepting as an intrinsic requirement for any safety management system 
(McDonald et al. 2000). As a result of this there has been research into some of the factors that can 
positively and negatively influence reporting.  
Management role in reporting has been seen as a primary factor for the uptake of reporting within an 
organisation (Reason, 1998). Research within industry has shown that the main barriers to reporting can 
include: the fear of being blamed, disciplined, embarrassed, or found legally liable (IMO, 2008) and these 
are most prevalent in an organisation that features a “blame orientated” culture (IMO, 2008). Other 
potential barriers are: unsupportive management attitudes such as complacency about known deficiencies 
(“it has happened before with no real consequences, so it won’t pose a future risk”), insincerity about 
addressing safety issues and discouragement of reporting of near-misses. Williamsen (2013) provides five 
fatal flaws that could undermine the reporting culture:  
1. Upper management believes in the program and provides financial support, but managers are not 
engaged and do not know how to be   
2. Safety professionals, who have the technology to be successful, struggle to effectively teach the 
organisation which is intuitive to them 
3. Supervisors, who do not want workers to get injured but do not want more non-value added 
(questionable worth) work forced upon them 
4. Hourly employees, who want to be safe, wonder “what’s in it for me” for reporting a near miss 
5. Data management can be a red herring. When no or few reports are received, there is no data to 
analyse and problems remain unknown. 
Kotter (1996) discusses several barriers that can prevent organisational change. In moving from a non-
reporting organisation to an openly reporting culture, one of the barriers discussed is the organisational 
“status quo” and how organisations can become comfortable with near misses. Near Misses have no 
injuries, minimal property damage, and they leave little or no evidence; as such it is easy (often desirable) 
to ignore them (Williamsen, 2013). As a result there is the possibility that workers will have no reason to 
believe that these reports will be viewed positively and acted upon.  
Leveson (2011) suggests that a poorly designed reporting system that involves additional steps such as 
logging onto a web-based system, one that is not part of normal operating procedure or environment, or a 
poorly designed form that requires reporters to add a lot of extra information, or a form that is not flexible 
enough to allow them to enter the information they want to provide can discourage people from taking part 
in the reporting process. 
There are several methodologies that can be used to help overcome these barriers and establish a 
positive reporting culture within an organisation. In Peterson (1993) there are six criteria of “safety 
excellence” that can be put into place to improve the safety culture.  
1. Top management is visibly committed to the process  
2. Middle management is actively involved in the program 
3. Supervisor performance is focused  
4. Hourly employees are actively participating 
5. System is flexible to accommodate site culture  
6. System is perceived as positive by the hourly workforce 
A common result of accident investigations is to suggest that organisations improve their reporting system 
to provide additional training in how to utilise it. However this response may be effective in the short term 
but people will eventually revert back to their prior behaviour (Leveson, 2011). 
Research, such as in Leva et al. (2010), highlights the benefits of implementing reporting as part of day to 
day operations; day-to-day reporting allows front-end personnel to act as a form of auditors of their 
organisation continuously and allows the level of risk within an organisation to be constantly monitored 
(Leva et al. 2010). There have been other developments in reporting methodologies; Wiegmann and von 
Thaden (2003) developed the “critical event reporting tool (CERT)” which was a form developed to collect 
event related information and to provide a free text way for pilots to think about and document the reasons 
why an incident occurred and the factors leading up to it (Wiegmann and von Thaden, 2003).  
To collect the most accurate data from an event a reporting system has to be completed as soon after the 
event as possible; Ericsson and Simon (1980) suggest the process of recalling an event is limited by the 
capacity of the short-term memory to the point where only the most recent experiences are directly 
reachable. Implementing a reporting system that fits into the day-to-day operations of the organisation and 
is filled, as a matter of routine will improve the quality of reporting within the organisation.  
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2.1 Modelling Reporting  
One method that can be used analyse a reporting system is to model the process using a task modelling 
technique. It is intended to use “SCOPE”.  SCOPE (Leva et al., 2011) is a software tool and a 
methodology that creates a visual model allowing an in-depth analysis of a task to be completed. By 
allowing relationships between actors, managers, resources, information systems, KPIs etc. to be included 
in the model, the relationships and the factors than can influence these entities can then be analysed using 
SCOPE. Leva et al. (2010) suggest that task modelling such as SCOPE can be utilised to map the current 
process within the industry, and to allow the task analysis of the reporting system to take place. This will 
allow analysis of the organisation’s reporting system to take place. The expected benefit of the work is the 
improvement of reporting practices in the partner organisation and the validation of the factors influencing 
reporting. 
2.2 Description of the Case Study 
The reporting cultures within different domains will be studied using this approach. So far the reporting 
system within a process industry organisation has been successfully modelled after interviews with 
management staff, currently the models have not received input from the reporting staff however this is 
planned for the future.  A second case study is planned with an organisation from the aircraft maintenance 
overhaul industry; a similar approach will be followed, and this will allow the current practice between two 
companies representative of two different industrial sectors to be analysed and compared  
2.3 Research Methodology 
This study forms part of an overall research project; which intends to implement an action research 
methodology to study current reporting standards within various industries and to develop and test a best 
possible practice for risk reporting within an organisations. Initially the current practice was modelled and 
to achieve this a series of site visits were completed and a series of semi-structured interviews with 
management took place to determine the current reporting system.   
The data from these interviews was coded and used to develop a series of models using SCOPE that will 
allow the current practice to be represented visually. The next phase will be to survey reporting staff to 
determine the cultural attitude and to seek validation of the model from the people using the system.  
2.4 The Models  
The information from the interviews was used to develop a series of SCOPE models detailing the process; 
there are too many to include in this short paper, however an example is shown in the Figure 1. SCOPE 
uses an adaption of the standard Business Process Modelling iconography.  Figure 1 shows a decision 
that will be taken by a Safety Manger, regarding the classification of an incident where a Good Save (near 
miss) would be treated differently by management, which is indicated by the deviation flow, each deviation 
flow will then lead to two different sub graphs which indicate the processes for dealing with good saves 
and incidents.  
 
 
 
The SCOPE model allows the relationships between actors, information flows etc. to be studied, and areas 
of vulnerability (tasks which can affect the whole process) can be explored using the SCOPE models.  
 
Figure 1 : SCOPE model showing a decision
process within the reporting system 
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The model produced with SCOPE can be utilised to analyse the reporting system within an industrial 
partner. Workshops will be held with management staff and with reporters to assess the reporting system 
and identify ways of streamlining and improving the system. SCOPE will be implemented both to assess 
the current reporting structures and to assist in the development of a new day-to-day reporting system. 
SCOPE also allows for a preliminary hazard analysis to be completed showing potential areas for 
improvement within the reporting system, an example is shown in Figure 2. In addition, SCOPE allows for 
a visual description of the information map showing information and means of communication shared 
among users so as to help highlight areas of a system where vulnerabilities in the information flow can be 
found, and identify ways of mitigating them. An example of an information map is shown in Figure 3.  The 
map shows that the reporting system success is heavily dependent on the reporters, safety management, 
culture and the supervisors; this backs up existing literature into this area, as discussed earlier on in the 
paper.  
Figure 3 : SCOPE information map showing the areas of vulnerability within the process 
3. Conclusion and Next Steps 
Before an improved reporting system can be developed it is good practice to assess the current practice, 
to identify areas of improvement and assist in collecting feedback from stakeholders in the system. 
Modelling the process using a task modelling system such as SCOPE will assist with this process. The 
models will help establish the current industrial practice and will allow a comparison between industries 
and the ideal theoretical practice to be drawn.  
The next steps will be to interview the people who will be making the reports into the system and to 
complete a series of workshops that will validate the modelling process, and allow improvements to be 
suggested.  The above process will be repeated within different industries, and will provide an insight into 
how the reporting systems are implemented across different industries. Once data has been collected from 
different industries a theoretical best practice reporting system will be developed, the implementation of a 
real world reporting system implementing this best practice will be undertaken and the effectiveness of the 
new system will be analysed.  
Figure 2 An example of a HAZOP from SCOPE 
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